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Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the
probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three
decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of
a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as
uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred
small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit
strategic coalition voting to inﬂuence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coali-
tion government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before
the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Coalition governments are the norm in many countries
with multi-party systems. Voters, however, can only cast
their ballot for an individual party or candidate, not
a speciﬁc coalition. Voters are certainly aware that coalition
formation is an additional and intermediary step between
vote decision and government formation, making any
predictions of likely governments rather difﬁcult (Downs,
1957). The instrumental goal of maximizing expected
utility by voting a speciﬁc government in ofﬁce quickly
becomes a highly challenging task. A vote for a speciﬁc
party and its policy will never directly result in a govern-
ment but at best secure a party’s membership in a coalition,
along with a “compromised” policy mix that the coalition
parties will eventually agree on.
If coalition governments are a fact of life, voters should
not only be aware of it but likely take coalition preferences
into account at the ballot box, at least if the political and
institutional context of an election provides thex: þ31 71 527 3815.
.nl (M.F. Meffert),
. All rights reserved.appropriate incentives. Rather surprisingly, previous
research has barely begun to address this question. Recent
work by Blais and colleagues (Aldrich et al., 2004; Blais
et al., 2006), Gschwend (2007), and Bargsted and Kedar
(2009) strongly suggests that coalition preferences and
expectations matter for particular subgroups of voters.
After reviewing recent theory and evidence about stra-
tegic coalition voting, we use data collected before the 2006
Austrian national election to identify relevant subgroups of
voters and test whether the effect of coalition preferences is
conditional on expectations about the electoral success of
parties and coalitions.
2. Strategic voting and coalition governments
In seminal works by authors such as Downs (1957) and
Cox (1997), rational and in particular strategic voting in
multi-party systems with coalition governments has been
treated with a lot of skepticism because decision scenarios
can very quickly become extraordinarily complex. With
each additional party, the number of theoretically possible
coalitions increases exponentially. A voter would have to
form expectations not only about the strength of the parties
but also about the likelihood that various combinations of
parties might agree to form a coalition after the election.
M.F. Meffert, T. Gschwend / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 339e349340While not denying the complexity of the decision task, it is
(or should be) less than an insurmountable challenge for
most voters, for a number of reasons. First, parties often
announce e and the media cover e positive and negative
coalition signals during the campaign (Gschwend, 2007;
Meffert and Gschwend, 2007, 2009), giving voters some
guidance about which coalition governments are possible
and/or likely. Second, voters as members of the polity
(paraphrasing Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989) will have
considerable experience with and knowledge about parties
and previous coalition governments which should help to
reduce the complexity of the decision task to a more
limited set of realistic options. Third, voters might have
clear preferences about which parties should form a coali-
tion and would have to focus only on the electoral chances
of the relevant parties. In short, voters might very well cast
their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that
a preferred coalition will be formed after the election.
Accordingly, we deﬁne strategic coalition voting as a vote
for a party other than the most preferred party in order to
elect the most preferred among all viable coalition
governments.
Previous research, as far as it exists, shows promise.
Starting with the fundamental questionwhether voters are
not only able to form rational expectations about coalition
governments but also successfully use them to maximize
expected utility, evidence from economic experiments by
Meffert and Gschwend (2007) and McCuen and Morton
(2010) suggests that voters are indeed able to use poll
and other relevant information to cast optimal votes, at
least under the ideal conditions of a laboratory experiment.
But support comes from survey research as well, even if
most previous research with direct relevance shares
a striking commonality: It uses Israel’s polarized multi-
party system as the setting. Blais et al. (2006) use data
from the 2003 Israeli national election to demonstrate that
coalition preferences have an impact above and beyond the
typical predictors of voting behavior such as preferences for
parties, candidates, and ideology. In fact, the authors ﬁnd
that about one in ten voters passes a series of stringent
conditions, that is, that they have only one preferred party,
only one preferred coalition, and voted for one of the
parties in the preferred coalition (other than the most
preferred party). The authors only address coalition pref-
erences, not expectations about electoral viability in their
study. In an earlier analysis (Aldrich et al., 2004), the
authors ﬁnd that expectations did not affect the vote
intentions of supporters of right-religious parties, but that
they mattered for vote intentions for the moderate Shinui
party which was expected to facilitate a secular coalition.
The effect of expectations was operationalized and tested
as a main effect, or in the case of Shinui, as a single
dichotomous variable capturing both a coalition preference
and its electoral viability. As a consequence, this limited
operationalization fails to fully test any conditional or
interactive effect of coalition preferences and expectations.
Bargsted and Kedar (2009) explicitly introduce expec-
tations into their model for the 2006 Israeli election and
argue that voters on the left or right who expect an unfa-
vorable right- or left-leaning coalition to win will be more
likely to desert their preferred party and rather vote for themost moderate party in the expected coalitione essentially
to prevent the worst. Ideologically extreme voters, on the
other hand, are not thought to be susceptible to such
instrumental strategic considerations and rather express
their preferences sincerely. Theoretically, the argument
assumes a unidimensional political space, something that
might not always be given or relevant for coalition forma-
tion. Most important, Bargsted and Kedar (2009) include
individual expectations in their model and demonstrate
their effect on vote decisions. This operationalization,
however, does not match the ﬁnal logical conclusion of
their argument. If we accept that the effect of coalition
preferences depends on the expectation of their electoral
success, the argument assumes an interaction effect. The
authors report an unsuccessful test of such interaction
effects and argue that their estimation procedure (condi-
tional logistic regressionmodel) already captures nonlinear
effects. Thus, the hypothesized interaction effect requires
a more conclusive test with additional data.
Israel is certainly not the only country with coalition
governments. Other studies on strategic voting in multi-
party systems using proportional representation and coa-
lition governments further support the notion that coali-
tion preferences matter. For Germany, Pappi and Thurner
(2002) as well as Gschwend (2007) show that various
forms of coalition-related voting behavior exist though
only Gschwend (2007) ﬁnds support for a threshold
insurance strategy. In the latter case, supporters of major
parties sometimes vote for the preferred small coalition
partner if the latter is in danger of falling below
a minimum vote threshold (often called a “rental” vote or
Leihstimme).
The question of coalition voting is closely related, if not
mostly identical, to strategic voting (Cox, 1997; Fisher,
2004). Strategic voting has been documented for
a number of parliamentary democracies with multi-party
systems (not all with coalition governments), including
Germany (Bawn, 1999; Gschwend, 2004; Pappi and
Thurner, 2002), Great Britain (Alvarez and Nagler, 2000;
Franklin et al., 1994; Lanoue and Bowler, 1992; Niemi
et al., 1992), The Netherlands (Irwin and Van Holsteyn,
2002, 2003), Canada (Blais et al., 2001, 2005; Lanoue and
Bowler, 1998), and New Zealand (Karp et al., 2002). Both
strategic and coalition voting assume that voters with an
instrumental motivationwill vote for a party other than the
most preferred party if the former has a better chance to
inﬂuence government formation. Even if a voter prefers
a coalition to an individual party, the simple fact that he or
she cannot directly e sincerely or “expressively” e vote for
a coalition requires tactical or strategic behavior.
3. When and how do expectations matter?
Inﬂuencing the formation of the next government is the
ultimate goal of strategic voting. But it is useful to distin-
guish between strategic voting decisions that are directed
towards the representation of a particular small party in
parliament, an obvious requirement for joining any
government, and strategies towards the composition of the
coalition government (see also Hobolt and Karp’s discus-
sion of policy-maximizing strategic voting in the
M.F. Meffert, T. Gschwend / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 339e349 341introduction to this Special Issue). In the case of small
parties, the threat of minimum vote thresholds that must
be passed to qualify for seats can create uncertainty about
the representation of that party and provide supporters of
the larger coalition partner with an incentive to cast
a strategic rental vote for the small party and desired coa-
lition partner. This is also referred to as ‘threshold insur-
ance policy’ (Hobolt and Karp, 2010). While anecdotal
evidence exists (e.g., Blais and Massicotte, 1996; Cox, 1997;
Pappi and Thurner, 2002; Roberts, 1988), no systematic
evidence has been found for this type of behavior yet with
the exception of Germany (Gschwend, 2007).
If it is certain that a small party will not be represented
in the next legislature, then supporters of that party have
an incentive to avoid awasted vote for their preferred party
and should rather vote for the party that is expected to
produce the most preferred among the viable coalition
governments. Only if the representation of a small party is
certain, voters have no representation-based incentive for
strategic voting.
A second set of incentives is based on the expected
composition of the next government. As long as the most
preferred coalition is expected to get a majority, coalition
preferences should not offer additional incentives for stra-
tegic voting. Nevertheless, party or policy preferences still
might lead voters to try to affect theweight of the individual
coalition members (portfolio strategy; e.g. Cox, 1997). If the
most preferred coalition is not expected to get a majority,
a strategic vote for a party in the expected but less preferred
coalition might move the policy position of that coalition
closer to the voter’s own policy position (coalition-targeted
Duvergerian voting; Bargsted and Kedar, 2009; Hobolt and
Karp, 2010). If a voter is entirely uncertain about which
coalitionwill get amajority, coalition preferences are rather
unlikely to affect vote decisions. In this case, party prefer-
ences should dominate the vote decision.
Finally, it is quite likely that for some coalitions, in
particular a grand coalition of the two largest parties with
a certain majority, expectations are rather meaningless.
Only decision contexts that offer real alternative choices
allow voters to form meaningful expectations about elec-
toral outcomes which in turn should moderate the inﬂu-
ence of coalition preferences on strategic vote decisions.
Thus, it is necessary to determine a priori particular subsets
of voters who should have an incentive to cast a strategic
vote in favor of a coalition.
4. Identifying opportunities for strategic voting: the
2006 Austrian national election
The study of strategic voting, with or without coalitions,
faces methodological and practical challenges. First, only
a small number of voters will usually ﬁnd themselves in
a situation that provides the appropriate incentives and
opportunities for strategic and/or coalition voting (e.g.
Alvarez et al., 2006). Second, adequate and speciﬁc
measures of party and coalition preferences are missing in
the available data, not to mention expectations about
electoral outcomes. Third, the number of voters who cast
a clearly identiﬁable strategic or coalition vote (which by
deﬁnition must be insincere and instrumental) is verysmall. This makes any systematic analysis and assessment
of strategic voting very difﬁcult. Our study was designed to
address at least the lack of detailed and appropriate
measures for preferences and expectations.
The setting of the study is the 2006 Austrian national
election for a new Nationalrat (see Müller, 2008 for
a detailed summary). At the beginning of the campaign, six
parties, four old and two fairly new parties, had reasonable
chances of obtaining seats in the next parliament, including
the two large parties that have dominated Austrian politics
for more than ﬁfty years, the governing conservative
People’s Party (ÖVP) and the oppositional Social Democrats
(SPÖ). The two smaller and established parties included the
nationalist and populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the
environmental Greens (Die Grünen). Both were expected to
draw considerable support, with an election result in the
double-digits either possible or likely. The two remaining
small parties had been established not very long before the
election. The ﬁrst, the Alliance for the Future of Austria
(BZÖ), was founded in the spring of 2006 by former
members of the FPÖ, including all FPÖ ministers of the
coalition government with the ÖVP, and most FPÖ
members in parliament. As a consequence, the BZÖ
replaced the FPÖ as the junior coalition partner of the ÖVP
at that time. According to the polls, the BZÖ had rather slim
chances of passing the minimum vote threshold of 4%. The
second new party or list, “Liste Dr. Martin,” was primarily
a one-man show by an independent member of the Euro-
pean Parliament who hoped to repeat his very successful
run in the 2004 European election (mostly as a protest
against the established parties). The polls gave him
a reasonable chance of passing the minimum threshold.
The incumbent coalition of ÖVP and BZÖ was neither
popular nor likely to get a new mandate, but the polls still
suggested that the ÖVP would stay ahead of the SPÖ by
a few percentage points. With two parties close to the 4%
minimum vote threshold, the outcome of the election was
fairly open and a strategic Austrian voter faced a difﬁcult
choice. The parties contributed to this uncertainty by
sending out only few and mixed coalition signals. The ÖVP
as the likely winner refrained from explicit or ofﬁcial coa-
lition signals. It only ruled out a coalition with the FPÖ, but
both the Greens and the SPÖ were seen as possible part-
ners. The SPÖ also refrained from making explicit and
ofﬁcial statements but saw Greens and ÖVP as possible
coalition partners, clearly ruling out the two nationalist,
far-right parties FPÖ and BZÖ. The attitudes toward Martin,
a former member of the SPÖ, remained ambiguous but
rather negative. The Greens explicitly campaigned without
a coalition statement and tried to keep equal distance to
both ÖVP and SPÖ, though the Social Democrats were seen
as the slightly favored partner (e.g., Debus, 2007: p. 57). The
FPÖ ruled out any participation in a coalition government
while BZÖ and Martin would both consider a coalitionwith
ÖVP and SPÖ. In short, the three most likely outcomes
included a grand coalition between ÖVP and SPÖ (which
would have a certain majority of seats) or a coalition of ÖVP
or SPÖ with the Greens as junior partner. This situation
provides a good opportunity to investigate the effect of
voters’ coalition preferences and expectations and their
effect on vote intentions.
Table 1
Party preferences.
Unique
preferences
Multiple
preferences
N % N %
Single party 1150 76.6 e e
ÖVP 444 29.6 573 38.2
SPÖ 330 22.0 474 31.6
Green 246 16.4 353 23.5
FPÖ 69 4.6 115 7.7
BZÖ 22 1.5 51 3.4
Martin 39 2.6 62 4.1
Two-Party Ties 232 15.5 e e
Indifferent 67 4.5
Alienated 31 2.1
Missing 21 1.4
Total 1501
Note: A unique preference is assigned if a single party has the highest
rating. Multiple preferences are assigned to up to two parties with highest
rating. Indifferent respondents have multiple ties and alienated respon-
dents have only negative ratings.
Source: Pre-election study (nationally representative sample) of 2006
Austrian national election.
Table 2
Sincere, insincere, and no vote intentions by party preference.
ÖVP
%
SPÖ
%
Green
%
FPÖ
%
BZÖ
%
Martin
%
Unique preferences
Sincere vote intention 70.5 77.6 69.9 68.1 54.6 30.8
Insincere vote intention 4.1 4.2 11.0 17.4 22.7 20.5
Abstention/Don’t Know 25.5 18.2 19.1 14.5 22.7 48.7
(N) (444) (330) (246) (69) (22) (39)
Multiple preferences
Sincere vote intention 63.4 71.1 65.2 60.0 51.0 35.5
Insincere vote intention 4.2 5.1 9.6 14.8 21.6 17.7
Abstention/Don’t Know 32.5 23.8 25.2 25.2 27.5 46.8
(N) (573) (474) (353) (115) (51) (62)
Note: Party preference represents the top-rated party (multiple prefer-
ences allow for two-party ties). A sincere vote intention is for (one of) the
top-rated parties and an insincere vote intention is for a party other than
a top-rated party.
Source: Pre-election Study (nationally representative sample) of the 2006
Austrian national election.
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missed the election outcome. The ÖVP (34.3%) lost more
support than expected and ﬁnished behind the SPÖ (35.3%).
Greens (11.0%) and FPÖ (11.0%) performed very well, and
the BZÖ (4.1%) managed to just pass the minimum vote
threshold. Martin (2.8%), on the other hand, fell far short of
the threshold. As neither Greens nor FPÖ had enough seats
to form a government with either SPÖ or ÖVP, the latter
two eventually agreed on a grand coalition.
5. Data and methods
Our data comes from a pre-election survey that inter-
viewed a nationally representative sample of 1501
respondents and an additional and smaller sample of 450
respondents in the state Carinthia. The survey was con-
ducted by phone during the three weeks (September
18e30) preceding the election on October 1, 2006. Given
the interest in voters’ expectations and coalition prefer-
ences, respondents were asked to rate not only the six main
parties but also seven speciﬁc coalitions that either had
a realistic chance of reaching a majority in the election or
were discussed during the campaign. The 11-point rating
scale for parties and coalitions ranged from 5 (“don’t like
the party/prefer the coalition at all”) to þ5 (“like the party
very much/absolutely prefer the coalition”). The leading
candidate of each party was rated on a similar scale as well.
The survey measured respondents’ expectations about
coalitions by asking respondents about the likelihood that
a given coalition would have a majority to form a govern-
ment after the election, using a 4-point scale ranging from
“certainly not” over “rather uncertain” and “certain” to
“very certain.” For the small parties, respondents indicated
their likelihood that the parties would receive sufﬁcient
votes to obtain seats in parliament using again the 4-point
certainty scale. The key dependent variable is the respon-
dents’ vote intention for the upcoming election.
6. Results
6.1. Party preferences and vote intentions
In a ﬁrst step, we determine the respondents’ party
preferences. We use the party ratings to assign each
participant dichotomous party-preference indicators.
Unlike the familiar party identiﬁcation question that can
identify only a single party, party ratings provide more
complete information about the party preferences of the
respondents, including those respondents who do not have
a long-term party identiﬁcation and those who prefer more
than one party. Table 1 summarizes the party preferences
of the respondents in two ways. In the ﬁrst column,
respondents are assigned a unique party preference if they
evaluate a single party higher than all the other parties.
Respondents with these unique party preferences are
differentiated from those with multiple preferences, in
particular those who give two parties the highest rating,
those who are indifferent (three or more parties ranked
highest), and those who are alienated (only negative
ratings). This classiﬁcation shows that three-quarters of the
respondents have a unique party preference, but it excludesa considerable number of voters with two-party ties. Given
that our interest is in the effect of coalition preferences, it
would be questionable to exclude voters with dual party
preferences. If we consider both parties in a two-party tie
as valid party preferences, we can assign party preferences
to more than 90% of our sample. Consequently, the party
preferences in the subsequent analyses allow for two-party
ties and thus are not unique for some of the respondents.
The second entry in Table 1 shows the distribution of these
“multiple” party preferences.
The consequences of these two classiﬁcations can be
shown by comparing the vote intentions for the different
partisan groups. Table 2 differentiates the vote intentions
into “sincere” votes for the most preferred party (or one of
two parties), “insincere” votes for a different party, or no
vote intention for those who planned to abstain or had not
made up their mind. The sincere and insincere vote
Table 3
Vote intention by party evaluations, candidate evaluations, and coalition preferences (likely voters with vote intentions).
ÖVP/FPÖ SPÖ/FPÖ Green/FPÖ BZÖ/FPÖ Martin/FPÖ
Party evaluations
ÖVP Party 0.78*** (0.18) 0.20 (0.13) 0.05 (0.16) 0.29 (0.21) 0.35 (0.25)
SPÖ Party 0.73*** (0.16) 0.45*** (0.14) 0.90*** (0.18) 0.14 (0.24) 0.79*** (0.25)
Green Party 0.18 (0.14) 0.05 (0.12) 1.42*** (0.21) 0.17 (0.21) 0.13 (0.21)
FPÖ Party 0.94*** (0.14) 0.51*** (0.11) 0.66*** (0.15) 1.16*** (0.24) 0.55*** (0.18)
BZÖ Party 0.19 (0.17) 0.05 (0.15) 0.09 (0.19) 1.46*** (0.31) 0.28 (0.25)
Martin List 0.24 (0.19) 0.05 (0.16) 0.29 (0.19) 0.39 (0.27) 0.74** (0.35)
Candidate evaluations
ÖVP candidate 0.66*** (0.16) 0.02 (0.12) 0.12 (0.14) 0.01 (0.21) 0.40* (0.24)
SPÖ Candidate 0.09 (0.14) 0.23** (0.12) 0.12 (0.14) 0.21 (0.19) 0.05 (0.23)
Green candidate 0.27** (0.14) 0.13 (0.12) 0.09 (0.16) 0.23 (0.18) 0.13 (0.21)
FPÖ candidate 0.26** (0.13) 0.17* (0.10) 0.30** (0.15) 0.09 (0.23) 0.30 (0.21)
BZÖ candidate 0.04 (0.17) 0.02 (0.14) 0.08 (0.20) 0.25 (0.27) 0.26 (0.29)
Martin candidate 0.23 (0.18) 0.06 (0.16) 0.17 (0.19) 0.29 (0.27) 0.68* (0.38)
Coalition preferences
ÖVPeSPÖ 0.05 (0.10) 0.16** (0.08) 0.09 (0.10) 0.22 (0.16) 0.35* (0.18)
ÖVPeFPÖ 0.42*** (0.13) 0.05 (0.10) 0.30** (0.15) 0.19 (0.20) 0.17 (0.19)
ÖVPeBZÖ 0.07 (0.15) 0.00 (0.15) 0.15 (0.18) 0.29 (0.22) 0.25 (0.28)
ÖVPeFPÖeBZÖ 0.20 (0.13) 0.03 (0.13) 0.47*** (0.17) 0.09 (0.17) 0.34 (0.23)
ÖVPeGreen 0.24* (0.12) 0.07 (0.11) 0.27* (0.14) 0.18 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19)
SPÖeGreen 0.24** (0.12) 0.06 (0.11) 0.00 (0.12) 0.05 (0.17) 0.13 (0.23)
SPÖeGreeneMartin 0.08 (0.13) 0.10 (0.10) 0.03 (0.12) 0.39 (0.25) 0.15 (0.18)
Constant 1.57 (1.42) 0.45 (1.07) 2.35 (1.60) 6.29** (2.64) 3.86* (2.10)
N 929
log likelihood 310.24
Note: entries are multinomial logistic regression coefﬁcients, with standard errors in parentheses. The vote intention for the FPÖ is the comparison category.
*p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01
Source: pre-election Study of the 2006 Austrian national election including the over-sample of Carinthia.
2 Pappi (2007) employs a more restrictive modeling strategy by a priori
excluding the possibility of cross-party effects.
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siﬁcations, but the number of respondents without a vote
intention increases if the multiple preferences measure is
used (with the exception of Martin supporters). Substan-
tively, the results show that the supporters of the two large
parties ÖVP and SPÖ were least likely to cast insincere
votes. However, more ÖVP supporters were unsure about
their vote or planned to abstain, foreshadowing the ÖVP
loss to the SPÖ in the election. SPÖ supporters were obvi-
ously better motivated to turn out. Supporters of small
parties were more likely to cast insincere or strategic votes,
in particular the supporters of FPÖ, BZÖ, and Martin.
However, these parties were also least likely to join the
next government e or parliament, for that matter.
Supporters of the Greens fell somewhat in the middle.
About one in 10 planned to vote insincerely.
6.2. Establishing a baseline: the effect of coalition preferences
After these preliminary assessments, we ﬁrst address
a very basic question: Do coalition preferences matter? We
test the effect of coalition preferences by regressing the
vote intention of likely voters for one of the six relevant
parties on party evaluations, candidate evaluations, and
coalition preferences using the whole sample. Party ratings
were used as a substitute for dichotomous party preference
indicators as some of the coefﬁcients cannot be estimated
with the latter (due to lack of variance or an insufﬁcient
number of respondents for some preference combinations).
The results, however, are fairly equivalent. Candidate
evaluations are included because the leading candidates of
the parties played a prominent and highly visible roleduring the campaign, most notably in a series of pair-wise
television debates in the weeks preceding the election. The
model is estimated with a multinomial logistic regression
without restricting the effects of the party-speciﬁc vari-
ables on the respective party. Attitudes toward a party,
candidate, or coalitionmight very well cross party lines. For
example, a dislike of a left-of-center coalition of SPÖ and
Greens might increase the likelihood of endorsing a right-
of-center party.2 The vote intention for the FPÖ is used as
the comparison category.
The results in Table 3 show that party ratings (or pref-
erences) are generally the strongest predictors, in partic-
ular for the preferred party. The effects of the party ratings
also suggest some polarization between the FPÖ and all
other parties e even among the supporters of the two far
right parties. They do have a clear dislike for each other. The
more respondents like the FPÖ, the less likely they are to
vote for any other party (and vice versa).
The candidate effects are more modest, with the
exception of the incumbent chancellor Schüssel (ÖVP).
Turning to the coalition preferences, the number of signif-
icant effects is small but suggests some polarization with
respect to the two far right parties and the Greens. For the
former, the respondents favoring a coalition of ÖVP and
FPÖ (which was ruled out by both parties) weremore likely
to cast a strategic vote for the ÖVP instead of the FPÖ. And
those (few) favoring a right-of-center “unity” coalition of
ÖVP, FPÖ, and BZÖ were less likely to vote for the Greens
Table 4
Vote intentions of ÖVP supporters in Carinthia, by Party, candidate, and
coalition preferences and expectations.
Other/ÖVP BZÖ/ÖVP
Party evaluation (ÖVP) 5.68*** (1.50) 0.85 (4.70)
Coalition preference
(ÖVPeBZÖ Coalition)
0.14 (0.82) 4.00** (1.88)
Expectation
(BZÖ uncertain¼ 1)
0.72 (0.55) 13.88** (6.62)
Coalition preference Expectation 2.05** (1.03) 14.35* (7.61)
Candidate differential 2.20*** (0.67) 4.21*** (1.61)
Constant 5.97*** (1.43) 2.44 (3.72)
log likelihood 126.80
N 189
Note: entries are multinomial logistic regression coefﬁcients, with robust
standard errors in parentheses, based on all ÖVP supporters in Carinthia.
The vote intention for the ÖVP is the comparison category.
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Source: pre-election Study of the 2006 Austrian national election
including the over-sample of Carinthia.
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analysis suggest that speciﬁc coalition preferences have
a direct, unconditional effect above and beyond party and
candidate ratings on the decisions to vote for particular
parties.
6.3. Expectations and strategic coalition voting
So far, the analyses have focused on the overall effects of
coalition preferences across the whole sample without
considering voters’ expectations about election outcomes
and the particular decision contexts that should provide
explicit incentives for strategic voting among subgroups of
voters. A meaningful test whether voters engage in stra-
tegic voting is only possible if voters face a consequential
decision context in which real alternative choices are
available (Alvarez et al., 2006). The 2006 Austrian election
offers three speciﬁc decision contexts in which strategic
coalition voting should be likely, (1) a rental vote of a major
party supporter in favor of an endangered junior coalition
partner to secure the latter’s representation in parliament,
(2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that
is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and
(3) explicit strategic coalition voting to inﬂuence the
composition and/or portfolio of the next government by
casting a vote for a party that makes a preferred coalition
more likely.
6.3.1. Rental vote strategy
The ﬁrst strategy assumes that supporters of large
parties who favor a coalition with a small party might
consider strengthening the endangered small coalition
partner. Hobolt and Karp (2010) refer to this as the ‘insur-
ance threshold policy’ type of strategic voting. In the 2006
election, however, both large parties were in a tight race for
the ﬁrst place, providing their supporters with no real
incentive to desert their preferred party. An exception is the
state of Carinthia with a strikingly different decision
context. At the state level, the BZÖ is a large party and thus
had a realistic chance to win at least one regional seat
which would allow the party to bypass (or exempt it from)
the national minimum vote threshold and obtain seats in
parliament (Müller, 2005: p. 402). Given this decision
context, ÖVP supporters in Carinthia had an (albeit small)
incentive to cast a rental vote for the BZÖ if they preferred
this party as junior coalition partner and were uncertain
about its electoral chances. Thus, the subsequent analysis is
based on all ÖVP supporters in Carinthia (n¼ 189).
ÖVP supporters in Carinthia should be more likely to
cast a vote for their potential junior coalition partner if they
were uncertain about the electoral prospects of the BZÖ.
We operationalize ‘uncertain’ respondents as a dummy and
code them as ‘1’ if they think that it is “rather uncertain”
that the BZÖ is getting into parliament or do not report an
answer. These are respondents who are neither absolutely
certain that the BZÖ will be represented in parliament nor
absolutely certain that the BZÖ will gain representation in
any event. Moreover, uncertain ÖVP supporters should be
all the more likely to deviate from their most preferred
party and cast a rental vote for the potential junior coalition
partner the more they prefer a ÖVP-BZÖ coalition. We testthis hypothesis by regressing the vote intentions of ÖVP
supporters in Carinthia on their preference for the ÖVP-
BZÖ coalition, their expectation about the prospects of the
BZÖ gaining representation in parliament, and the respec-
tive interaction effect while controlling for the ÖVP evalu-
ation. The model must account for an additional
complication. The BZÖ as a party cannot be separated from
its prominent party leader(s) who dominate and publicly
represent the party. Thus, any vote for the BZÖmight reﬂect
a candidate preference for the party leader instead of
strategic considerations such as a rental vote for a junior
coalition partner. In order to control for candidate effects
we generate a candidate differential by subtracting the
thermometer ratings (recoded to the unit interval) of the
BZÖ candidate from the one of the ÖVP candidate and
include it in the model. We summarize the estimation
results in Table 4. Because the base category for comparison
is the vote intention for the ÖVP, we expect a positive
interaction effect of preferences and expectations for the
decision between ÖVP and BZÖ.
The results support this hypothesis as the estimates in
the right column show. Supporters of the ÖVP in Carinthia
who were uncertain about the prospects of the BZÖ were
more likely to desert their most preferred party, the ÖVP,
and cast a strategic rental vote for the BZÖ, even if the party
evaluation for the ÖVP is controlled for. The evidence is
consistent with the idea that ÖVP supporters tried to help
the BZÖ to win a regional seat and circumvent the minimal
vote threshold on the national level. Furthermore, ÖVP
supporters who ranked the ÖVPeBZÖ coalition very high
were generally more likely to cast a vote for the BZÖ
independently of their expectations about the prospects of
the BZÖ. Nevertheless, the results also indicate that voters
who evaluate the respective candidates differently were
more likely to vote for the party of the more preferred
candidate.
To what extent affect these expectations individual vote
choice decisions? We focus on ÖVP supporters who were
either uncertain or not uncertain about the electoral
chances of the BZÖ. The effect of those expectations
becomes apparent by comparing the predicted probabili-
ties of a BZÖ vote across the entire range of ÖVPeBZÖ
Table 5
Vote intentions of BZÖ supporters, by party, candidate, and coalition
preferences and expectations.
Other/BZÖ ÖVP/BZÖ
Party evaluation (BZÖ) 3.57** (1.49) 6.51** (2.97)
Coalition preference
(ÖVPeBZÖ Coalition)
0.73* (0.43) 0.18 (0.50)
Expectation
(BZÖ not in parliament¼ 1)
1.19** (0.57) 2.76** (1.21)
Coalition preference expectation 1.06 (0.70) 1.84* (0.99)
Candidate differential 0.82 (0.65) 3.80** (1.49)
Constant 3.01** (1.27) 1.30 (2.63)
log likelihood 64.65
N 102
Note: entries are multinomial logistic regression coefﬁcients, with stan-
dard errors in parentheses, based on all BZÖ supporters. The vote inten-
tion for the BZÖ is the comparison category.
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
Source: pre-election Study of the 2006 Austrian national election
including the over-sample of Carinthia.
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Fig. 1. Effect of coalition preferences and expectations on vote intentions of
ÖVP supporters in Carinthia (rental votes). Note: simulated vote intentions
based on MNL regression model in Table 4.
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inthia. We hold the party preference variable constant at
the sample mean and set the candidate differential variable
to zero. Fig. 1 shows the predicted probabilities of a stra-
tegic rental vote for the BZÖ depending on the strength of
the respective coalition preference. As predicted,
supporters of the large party (ÖVP) are more likely to cast
a rental vote for the small coalition partner (BZÖ) if the
electoral chances of the latter are seen as uncertain and
with an increasing preference for such a coalition. ÖVP
supporters uncertain about the electoral chances of the
BZÖ are almost always more likely to vote for the BZÖ than
supporters who are not uncertain about their small coali-
tion partner. Only large party supporters who prefer this
coalition even more than their own party are an exception.
For these voters, the expectations about the electoral
prospects of the potential coalition partner fail to exert the
expected effect. These voters seem to vote strategically for
the small coalition partner no matter how uncertain the
electoral expectations of the BZÖ. However, this pattern can
still be seen as consistent with a portfolio strategy, that is,
coalition supporters trying to affect the weight of the
individual coalition members within the coalition.
These results generally conﬁrm our expectations and
underline the important role of coalition preferences and
expectations for voting behavior. While rental votes
represent the observable outcome of a particular
individual-level strategy, it has clear implications for the
aggregate-level as well. The rental vote strategy speciﬁcally
favors small parties that are a preferred coalition partner as
opposed to large parties. Contrary towhat the conventional
wisdomwould suggest about the effects of strategic voting
in PR systems, small parties might very well be the bene-
ﬁciaries of strategic voting.
6.3.2. Wasted vote strategy
Following the wasted vote logic of the strategic voting
literature leads us to our second subgroup with a potential
incentive for strategic voting. Given the dismal chances of
their respective parties, supporters of the far-right BZÖ as
well as supporters of Martin had a clear incentive to desert
their preferred parties and cast a vote for another party that
had a realistic chance of joining the government. However,
the low number of such party supporters e even if we add
the subsample of Carinthia to the nationwide representa-
tive sample of eligible Austrian voters (as we do for the
following analysis) e allows only a systematic assessment
of BZÖ supporters (n¼ 102). BZÖ supporters who consider
a sincere vote to bewasted are expected to bemore likely to
cast a strategic vote for the ÖVP, the current coalition
partner and a likely member of the next government. The
higher an ÖVPeBZÖ coalition is rated, the stronger this
effect should become. As in the previous case of rental
votes, the particular nature of the BZÖ suggests that vote
decisions might be driven by candidate preferences instead
of strategic considerations. As a consequence, the hypoth-
esis is tested by regressing the vote intention of all BZÖ
supporters in the full sample (including the over-sample of
Carinthia) on BZÖ party evaluations, the candidate differ-
ential (as operationalized previously), coalition prefer-
ences, the expectation that the BZÖ will not be representedin parliament, and its respective interaction effect. The
expectation that the BZÖ will not be represented in
parliament was again operationalized as a dummy scored
‘1’ if a respondent reported to be ‘rather uncertain’ or
thought that the BZÖ would ‘certainly not’ be represented
(and ‘0’ otherwise). Table 5 summarizes the estimation
results.
The results support the hypothesis with regard to the
role of expectations for the decision between a strategic
ÖVP vote and a sincere BZÖ vote. If BZÖ supporters did not
expect their party to be represented in parliament, they
were indeed more likely to desert their party in favor of
a strategic vote for the ÖVP or another party including
abstention. By closely inspecting the estimated size of the
coefﬁcients, this result holds no matter how strongly the
respective ÖVP-BZÖ coalition was favored. Furthermore,
the signiﬁcant negative interaction term suggests that the
effect of expectations is in some sense counterbalanced by
a strong coalition preference for ÖVPeBZÖ.
What is the substantive implication of these results for
voting behavior? In order tomake the relationship between
Expectation BZÖ not in parliament
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Fig. 2. Effect of coalition preferences and expectations on ÖVP vote inten-
tions of BZÖ supporters (avoiding wasted votes). Note: simulated vote
intentions based on MNL regression model in Table 5.
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Fig. 2 shows the probability of casting a strategic vote for
the ÖVP across all possible preference values for an ÖVP-
BZÖ coalition and separately for those who did and did not
expect the BZÖ to gain representation. The simulations are
based on a typical small party supporter with the party
preference variable held constant at the sample mean and
the candidate differential variable set to zero. As predicted,
voters who do not expect the BZÖ to gain seats in parlia-
ment are more likely to defect to the ÖVP. The corre-
sponding line is consistently located above the line for
hypothetical BZÖ supporters who expect their party to re-
enter parliament. Because both lines are fairly ﬂat, the
interaction of coalition preferences and expectations does
not exhibit a substantively remarkable effect. In addition,
the probabilities of an ÖVP vote are fairly low, even lower
than the probabilities of voting for another party or
abstention (not shown). We can therefore conclude that
while expectations do increase the likelihood of an ÖVP
vote, expectations alone are not sufﬁcient to make suchTable 6
Vote intentions of Green supporters, by party preferences, coalition preferences,
SPÖ/Green
Green Party 10.55*** (3.34)
ÖVP Party 1.05 (0.97)
SPÖ Party 9.22*** (3.42)
ÖVPeSPÖ Coalition 1.73* (0.98)
SPÖeGreen Party Coalition
Preference 2.03** (0.90)
Expectation (majority uncertain¼ 1) 5.47*** (1.87)
Preference Expectation 5.80** (2.27)
ÖVPeGreen Party Coalition
Preference 4.62*** (1.18)
Expectation (majority uncertain¼ 1) 0.75 (0.91)
Preference expectation 0.63 (1.70)
Constant 3.88** (1.51)
N
log likelihood
Note: entries are multinomial logistic regression coefﬁcients, with standard error
Green Party is the comparison category.
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
Source: pre-election Study of the 2006 Austrian national election.a vote the most likely outcome for the average BZÖ
supporter.
6.3.3. Coalition composition strategy
In addition to coalition voting strategies related to
representation-based incentives such as rental votes and
strategic attempts to try to avoid a wasted vote, there are
also strategies that directly try to inﬂuence the composi-
tion of the next government. This is the ‘balancing
strategy’, described by Hobolt and Karp and McCuen and
Morton in this special issue. This leads us to our third
subgroup, Green Party supporters who where split in their
coalition preferences for one of the two major parties, SPÖ
or ÖVP. Green Party supporters constitute a fairly large
group (n¼ 336) and exhibit a more distinct pattern in their
voting intentions. Because their coalition expectations
show variance as well, it provides a window of opportunity
to investigate the direct impact of coalition preferences
and expectations.
How could coalition expectations affect supporters of
the Green Party? It was quite reasonable to expect that the
Green Party might ﬁnd itself in a position to form a coali-
tion with either one of the two major parties. Thus, the
expectation that either coalition will (not) have a majority
of seats should matter for the vote decision of Green Party
supporters. If the majority for a coalition is seen as uncer-
tain, Green Party supporters should become more likely to
cast a strategic vote for the preferred large coalition partner
as their coalition preference increases (making this defec-
tion less costly). We therefore expect that the likelihood of
a strategic vote for the larger coalition partner increases
with the respective coalition preference. If a coalition with
the Green Party would not reach a majority, a grand coa-
lition consisting of the two large parties SPÖ and ÖVP was
the most obvious alternative. As a consequence, Green
Party supporters’ intent on inﬂuencing the composition of
the government could cast a strategic vote to affect the
weight of the individual coalition members within the
grand coalition (portfolio strategy). A strategic vote for the
large coalition partner of their preferred coalition doesand expectations.
ÖVP/Green Other/Green
9.48 (7.30) 6.58*** (1.44)
10.79 (8.92) 1.01 (0.70)
0.80 (1.45) 0.15 (0.80)
1.92 (1.71) 1.03 (0.66)
0.08 (2.53) 2.42*** (0.73)
1.82 (2.11) 2.53*** (0.87)
2.96 (3.42) 2.93** (1.17)
7.45** (3.62) 1.71** (0.85)
8.58** (3.74) 0.90 (0.87)
9.62** (4.27) 0.92 (1.39)
9.34** (4.76) 6.64*** (1.37)
336
258.36
s in parentheses, based on all Green supporters. The vote intention for the
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Fig. 3. Effect of coalition preferences and expectations on SPÖ vote inten-
tions of green supporters. Note: simulated percentages based on MNL
regression model in Table 6.
3 It should be noted that the absolute value of the simulated proba-
bilities depends to a large extent on the particular scenario, that is, the
level at which the other party and coalition ratings are held constant.
Because the SPÖ was a close (or even tied) second preference for many
Green Party supporters, the defection rate of those considering an SPÖ-
Green Party coalition as certain is fairly high. If, however, the SPÖ rating is
set to a lower value, this defection rate to the SPÖ will also decrease.
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coalition. In short, uncertainty about the electoral chances
of the preferred coalition might motivate Green Party
supporters to behave strategically by deserting their
preferred party in favor of the less preferred large party
(i.e., the SPÖ) in order to directly inﬂuence the composition
of the likely but less preferred (grand) coalition govern-
ment. The more a Green Party supporter prefers the coali-
tion with the SPÖ, the stronger should this incentive for
a strategic vote become.
If a majority for the preferred coalition is certain or at
least not considered to be in danger, coalition preferences
should neither increase nor decrease the incentive to cast
a strategic vote for the respective large coalition partner.
Party preferences as well as preferences for the grand
coalition e the only coalition with a virtually certain
majority e should dominate the vote decision. These
hypotheses are tested by regressing the vote intentions of
Green Party supporters on the relevant party and coalition
preferences along with an interaction effect of coalition
preferences and expectations. The base category of the
dependent variable is a vote intention for the preferred
Green Party. The other three categories represent vote
intentions for SPÖ, ÖVP, and no or other vote intentions
such as abstention, a vote for an entirely different (protest)
party, or the inability to decide (it should be noted that the
number of Green Party supporters with a vote intention for
the ÖVP in our sample is precariously small). The inde-
pendent variables include the ratings of Greens, SPÖ, and
ÖVP, each expected to have a positive effect on the vote
intention for the evaluated party. The preferences for all
three coalitions are included as main effects as well. For the
two coalitions with the Greens, the expectation that each
coalition is ‘uncertain’ to reach a majority is operational-
ized as a dichotomous indicator. To capture the conditional
effects of the coalition preferences, interaction terms of
preferences and expectations are included as well. The
model is again estimated with a multinomial logistic
regression.
The results in Table 6 support our expectations with
respect to vote intentions for the SPÖ. Higher ratings ofGreens and SPÖ are associated with an increasing proba-
bility of voting for those parties, respectively. Higher Green
Party ratings also lower the likelihood of abstention or
a vote for another party. As predicted by the portfolio
strategy, those who rate a grand coalition of ÖVP and SPÖ
higher are more likely to cast a strategic vote for the SPÖ.
However, we do not ﬁnd equivalent results of party and
grand coalition preferences for the decision to cast a stra-
tegic vote for the ÖVP. With less than four percent of all
Green Party supporters in this subsample intending to vote
for the ÖVP, the results are not reliable and the predicted
substantive impact rather marginal.
Our main focus is on the conditional impact of coalition
preferences, depending on the expectation that a majority
for a potential coalition is uncertain. To ease the interpre-
tation of the impact of expectations and coalition prefer-
ences on vote intentions, the interaction effects are
simulated and presented in Fig. 3. It shows the predicted
probability of a strategic vote intention for the SPÖ across
all possible ratings of a SPÖ-Green Party coalition and
separately for those who expect that a majority for this
coalition is certain and those who see it as uncertain. The
simulation is based on a typical Green Party supporter, with
most other variables held constant at the sample mean.
Because the focus is on Green Party supporters with
a preference for a coalition with the SPÖ, the ÖVPeGreen
Party coalition rating is set to the minimum value and the
expectation for this coalition to ‘uncertain.’
The simulation in Fig. 3 supports our expectations. As
their preference for a SPÖ-Green Party coalition increases,
Green party supporters who are uncertain about a majority
for this coalition becomemore likely to defect to the SPÖ. If,
however, they consider a majority for this coalition to be
certain, coalition preferences do not have any meaningful
impact on the probability of casting a strategic vote for the
SPÖ.3 Finally, a similar simulation of a strategic ÖVP vote
intention of Green Party supporters who dislike the SPÖ-
Green Party coalition and rather prefer an ÖVPeGreen
Party coalition (not reported here) shows no meaningful
substantive results.
In summary, the SPÖ appears to be the main beneﬁciary
of strategic coalition voting by Green Party supporters. If
they perceive their preferred coalition as uncertain, they
become more likely to cast a strategic vote for the SPÖ.
Because the most likely alternative, a grand coalition, had
a certain majority, this vote decision might reﬂect less
a coalition composition strategy and rather a portfolio
strategy. By voting for the SPÖ, Green Party supporters
strengthen the role of the preferred large party in the
expected grand coalition. Unlike the rental vote strategy
discussed earlier, the coalition composition strategy did
favor the large parties in the 2006 Austrian election. But
under different election scenarios, it is also possible that
M.F. Meffert, T. Gschwend / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 339e349348major party supporters might vote strategically for a small
party in a likely but less preferred coalition.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Coalition governments are a common outcome in
multiparty democracies. A voter who wants to maximize
the probability that the most preferred coalition will be
formed after the election should take the likely electoral
outcome into account. Depending on the decision context,
such a decision might very well involve a vote for a party
other than the most preferred party. Strategic coalition
voting can result from a variety of mechanisms, and we
provide support for three of them, a rental vote of a major
party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition
partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote
threshold, avoiding a wasted vote for a preferred small
party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote
threshold, and explicit strategic coalition voting to inﬂu-
ence the composition and/or portfolio of the next govern-
ment by casting a vote for a party that makes the preferred
coalition more likely. The results based on a representative
pre-election survey in Austria strongly suggest that both
electoral expectations and coalition preferences matter for
individual vote decisions. We also ﬁnd some evidence for
an interactive effect of both factors.
The results of this study have a number of implications
that go beyond the political context of the Austrian 2006
election. Previous research on strategic voting was mainly
engaged in estimating the number of strategic voters in
speciﬁc elections. Given that this research consists mostly
of quantitative case studies of voting behavior under
majoritarian electoral rules, it was simply assumed that the
ﬂow of those strategic votes was towards identiﬁable
contenders for a seat in single-member districts at the cost
of electoral support of third or minor parties at the polls. By
taking the role of coalitions in post-electoral bargaining
processes and voters’ expectation thereof more seriously
we provide rationales as well as empirical evidence that the
electoral rules in PR systems provide more opportunities
for strategic voting, rather than less as is commonly
assumed.
There are essentially two different types of consider-
ations that might lead voters to cast their vote for a party
other than the most preferred party, those based on the
representation of small parties and those directed at the
composition of the next coalition government. Some voters
might care about the potential representation of a small
party in parliament. Large party supporters might cast
a strategic rental vote to secure the representation of
a small but preferred coalition partner in parliament.
Supporters of small parties, on the other hand, who do not
expect their preferred party to succeed, might try to avoid
casting a wasted vote and rather opt for an alternative that
could inﬂuence government formation in their favor. In
addition to representation-based considerations some
voters might attempt to directly inﬂuence which coalition
government is likely to be formed after the election, or if
a speciﬁc coalition is seen as certain, to at least try to
inﬂuence the weight of the member parties within this
coalition.Taking into account both coalition preferences and
expectations about the electoral outcome allows us to
generate ﬁner expectations under what conditions partic-
ular types of voters desert their most preferred party and
cast a strategic vote for some other party. Together with
previous work by Aldrich et al. (2004), Blais et al. (2006),
Gschwend (2007), and Bargsted and Kedar (2009), it is
save to conclude that coalition preferences matter for
voters in multiparty systems. The evidence presented here
suggests that strategic voting for coalitions is not a task of
insurmountable complexity but in the realm of the
possible. One obvious reason is the fact that of all theo-
retically possible coalitions among the competitive parties,
only very few have a realistic chance of success (see also
Armstrong and Duch, 2010). Most will be irrelevant
because they either do not have sufﬁcient electoral support
or because they are unlikely to agree on a coalition. Given
this dramatically reduced complexity, coalition voting
becomes a realistic proposition. As the respondents in our
study show, voters are able to rate and evaluate potentially
relevant coalitions that have realistic chances to form the
next government. In fact, more respondents in our sample
were able to rate coalitions than report their ideological
position or some issue positions.
Finally, the results of our study demonstrate that PR
systems with minimum vote thresholds can create strong
incentives for large party supporters to cast a strategic
rental vote for a small and preferred coalition partner. Our
ﬁnding of rental votes (that is, ÖVP supporters voting for
the BZÖ) corroborates a similar ﬁnding by Gschwend
(2007) for Germany. This has important implications for
the nature of party systems. Strategic voting does not
automatically facilitate the development of a stable party
systemdthe fundamental logic of majoritarian systems e
because not all strategies favor large parties over marginal
parties. Our evidence for strategic coalition voting
suggests that small parties can also beneﬁt from strategic
voting and thus might facilitate rather than prevent the
fragmentation of a party system eesomething that might
be of interest to electoral engineers when drafting new
election laws.
These analyses are only a ﬁrst step to determine the role
of coalition preferences and expectations for vote decisions.
In fact, we still do not know the answers to some very basic
questions, for example how party and coalition preferences
are related. In our study, about a third of the respondents
actually rated a coalition higher than the most preferred
party. Are these voters primarily coalition voters for whom
a party preference comes only second? A lot of work
remains to be done.Acknowledgements
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